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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
mining whether the agent was negligent; did it illucidate the point in
controversy? It appears that the statement does not aid in the determination of the facts of the collision. Hence, the statements are irrelevent in
determining the point in controversy in this suit. Gose v. True, 197 Iowa
1094; 198 N. W. 528; Home Insurance Co. of N. Y. City v. Marple, 1 Ind.
App. 411, 27 N. E. 633, 635; Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. and 1. G. N. Ry. Co.
v. T. B. Collier, 62 Tex. 318; Ward v. Linnerman, 201 Ky. 131, 255 S. W.
1036. Statements which do not illucidate or explain the point in controversy are irrevelent and inadmissable even if a part of the res gestae. Lund
v. Inhabitants of Tyngsborough, 9 Cush (Mass.) 36.
J. B. E.
HUSBAND AND WIFE--ToRTs--ACTION BY WIFE AGAINST HUSBAND FOR
LIBEL-P married D in 1893. In 1899 the parties separated under a deed of

separation and from then on lived apart. In 1929 P saw on a tombstone
in a churchyard an inscription to "Jennie (another woman) the dearly beloved wife of (defendant)." P sued D for libel. Held, that, though the inscription was capable of defamatory meaning, the P, by reason of sec. 12
of the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, could not sue her husband on
it, the action being for a tort and not for the protection and security of
her separate property. Ralston v. Ralston, (1930) 2 K. B. 238.
By the common law a wife could sue her husband on apparently only
one occasion, namely, if he levied a fine in her name; Co. Litt. 133, a. n.
4., and this disability continued into modern times until the rights of
women were enlarged by the Married Women's Acts. The reason why a
wife could not maintain an action against her husband was that the husband and wife were one person Phillips v. Barnet, 1 Q. B. D. 436 (1876).
The court in the principal case laid down the doctrine that under the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, every woman shall have in her own name
against all persons, including her husband, the same civil remedies for
the protection and security of her own separate property, as if such property belonged to her as a feme sole, but that no husband or wife could sue
the other for a personal tort. Remedially and Proceedurally the statutes
dealing with the rights of married women may be classified in seven general
groups: (1) those which deal with property and are silent as to remedies
(2) those which permit a married woman to sue or be sued only in respect
to property which constitutes her separate estate (3) those which expressly
exclude or refuse to authorize suits between husband and wife (4) those
which do not permit a married woman to sue or be sued by a third person
alone in her own name for personal torts (5) those which permit a married
woman to sue separately for tort committed against her (6) those which
in terms permit suits by and against married women as though they were
sole (7) those which in terms permit suits between husband and wife.
McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relations, 43 Harv. L. Rev.
p. 1037. The rule reached by the weight of authority is that a married
woman may sue her own husband, if necessary for the protection and security of her own separate property; but otherwise actions for a tort between husband and wife cannot be entertained. That is a wife may sue her
husband in an action which under the old forms of pleading would have
been trover for the recovery of her goods, or for a trespass or nuisance to
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land held by her as her separate property; but she may not sue him in a
civil action for a personal wrong such as assault, libel, or injury by negligence. Pollock on Torts (13th Ed.) p. 59; Clark and Lindell on Torts
(8th Ed.) p. 45. Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U. S. 611 (Harlan, Holmes
and Hughes, J. J. dissenting) ; Bandfield v. Bandfield, 117 Mich. 80; Schultz
v. Schultz, 59 N. Y. 644; Peters v. Peters, 156 Cal. 32; Keister's Adm'r '.
Keister's Ex'rs, 123 Va. 157. There is, however, a very respectable group
of jurisdictions which accord to the wife an action against her husband for
a personal tort, either as a result of express statutory provision, or by a
liberal interpretation of general statutory provisions declaring that a married woman shall have all the rights of a feme sole. Burdick on Torts
(4th ed.) p. 153; Braun v. Braun, 28 Conn. 42; Gilman v. Gilman, 78 N.
H. 4; Roberts v. Roberts, 185 N. C. 566; Fitzpatrick v. Owens, 124 A*.
167; Fiedeerv. Fiedeer,42 Okla. 124; Johnson v. Johnson, 201 Ala. 41. The
usual form of the statute gives the wife the right to sue "separately as
though unmarried." Some courts have interpreted this statute as leaving
the foundation of the common law marriage statute unchanged and merely
providing exceptions to the necessary consequences of that status, and
have held that exceptions, being contrary to the common law, are limited
by the necessary import of the language defining them. Peters v. Peters,
42 Ia. 102; Brandfield v. Brandfield, 117 Mich. 80; Schultz v. Schultz, 89
N. Y. 644. Some courts consider such statutes as in derogation of the common law and hence to be strictly construed. Compton v. Presson, 28 N. J.
Eq. 229. The reason for which the stronger of the more modern decisions
have denied one spouse the right to maintain an action for tort against the
other during coverture, has been, in the main, based upon public policy, on
the theory that to permit such an action would tend to invade the holy
salctity of the home and shatter the sacred relations between husband and
wife, and, therefore, for public policy's sake, such actions should not be
maintained; and yet those very decisions recognize that the civil courts
are open to parties seeking divorce and alimony, and that the criminal
courts are open for the prosecution of either husband or wife for assault
and battery. Fiedeer v. Fiedeer, 42 Okla. 124. The Indiana statute provides that a married woman may sue alone-(1) when the action concerns
her separate property. (2) when the action is between herself and her
husband: but in no case shall she be required to sue or defend by guardian
or next friend except she be under the age of twenty-one years. Burns
Ann. Ind. St. 1926, sec. 262. The point in question has not been adjudicated
in Indiana, but married women may sue their husbands in their own names
when the action concerns their separate property. Dailey v. Dailey, 26 Ind.
App. 14; Wilkins v. Milles, 9 Ind. 100; Crates v. Crates, 118 Ind. 521. An
analogous situation is where a minor child sues a parent for a personal
tort. A child cannot maintain an action against its parents for tortious
acts of such parent committed during the child's minority and while it is
unemancipated and a member of the parents' family; the common law
gave no such right of action and no statute has been enacted creating such
right. Smith v. Smith, 81 Ind. App. 566. A recent New Hampshire case is
contra and indicates that the law on this point and analogous situations is
still in a stage of development. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 150 Atl. (N. H., 1913)
905.
C. F. B.

